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Issue 2

COURTREPORTS

Mattaponi Indian Tribe v. Virginia, 524 S.E.2d 167 (Va. Ct. App.
2000) (holding that appellants had no standing to challenge a permit issued
by the state which certified that a reservoir project would comply with the
Clean Water Act).
In December 1997, the State Water Control Board ("Board") issued a
Virginia Water Protection Permit ("VWPP") to the City of Newport News
("City") to enable the City and surrounding communities to go forward
with a proposed reservoir project. The King William Reservoir project
was to consist of a 1526-acre impoundment produced by a new dam across
Cohoke Creek ("Creek"), a tributary of the Pamunkey River. In addition
to the new dam and reservoir, the project required the construction of a
water intake and pumping station that would take water from the Mattaponi
River ("River") and transport it to the reservoir.
The proposed dam would involve the "discharge of dredged or fill
material" into the Creek therefore requiring the State, under Clean Water
Act ("CWA") section 401(a), to certify to the United States Army Corps of
Engineers ("Corps") that the discharge would comply with any pertinent
provisions of the CWA. Without this certification, the Corps would not
issue a construction permit and the project would not be able to proceed.
Thus, the VWPP did not enable the project to commence, but was a
necessary step to obtain a construction permit from the Corps.
The Mattaponi Indian Tribe ("Tribe") appealed the Board's decision
based on two claims. First, the Tribe claimed that the Treaty at Middle
Plantation established a duty on the Commonwealth to "protect the Tribe
from any encroachments within three miles of the Mattaponi Reservation,"
and that flooding on Indian land as a result of the project would breach that
duty. Second, the Tribe alleged that in awarding the VWPP the Board
discriminated against the Tribe by not considering the Tribe's cultural uses
of the River and the Creek, thus violating Title VI of the Civil Rights Act
of 1964. The circuit court that heard the appeal sustained the demurrers of
the Commonwealth and the City to the Tribes' appeal.
The Virginia Court of Appeal addressed three issues in this case: (1)
whether the Tribe had standing to challenge the Board's issuance of the
VWPP; (2) whether the Tribe sufficiently pled that the Commonwealth
breached the Treaty at Middle Plantation; and (3) whether the Tribe
sufficiently pled that the Commonwealth violated Title VI of the Civil
Rights Act. The court held that the Tribe lacked standing on all three
issues as any injury that would incur would be the result of the Corps'
issuance of a construction permit, not the Board's issuance of a VMPP.
The court identified the test for Article III standing as: (1) an actual or
imminent injury which was an invasion of a legally protected interest and
which was concrete and particularized; (2) an injury fairly traceable to the
defendant; and (3) an injury likely to be redressed by a favorable decision
of the court.
The court determined the general issue of whether the Tribe had
standing to challenge the Board's ruling by applying the second part of the
standing requirement. Any injury suffered by the Tribe would be the result
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of the independent action of the Corps in awarding a construction permit
which was not fairly traceable to any of the defendants in this action, the
City, the Commonwealth, or the Board.
Without ruling on whether the land in question was subject to the
Treaty at Middle Plantation, the court viewed the issue of violation of the
Treaty with respect to part one of the standing test. There was no actual or
imminent injury to any of the Tribes' alleged property rights because any
harm would be the result of the Corps issuing a construction permit, not
the Board issuing a VMPP.
The court then summarily dismissed the Tribes' Title VI claim as being
without merit. The court pointed out that Title VI has the same standing
requirements and that the Tribe had failed to meet them. The court added
no discussion as to any possible validity to the claim outside of the standing
issue.
Spencer L. Sears
WASHINGTON
Currens v. Sleek, No. 66830-2, 1999 Wash. LEXIS 883 (Wash. Sept. 9,
1999) (holding that the common enemy doctrine shielded a landowner from
liability for surface water flooding only if the landowner exercised due care
in preventing unnecessary injury to neighboring properties).
The Currenses sought review of an unpublished appeals court decision
affirming the summary judgment dismissal of their complaint against Irene
Sleek and Dennis Stephenson Logging ("Logging"). At issue was whether
liability may arise for property damage caused by an increased flow of
surface water onto the Currenses' property after Sleek clear-cut and graded
her land.
The Currenses and Ms. Sleek owned neighboring property in Clark
County. Water from a portion of the Sleek property naturally seeped into a
forested, low-lying sink area on the Currenses' property. In 1993, Sleek
decided to clear-cut her property in order to develop four home sites. As
required by the State Environmental Policy Act of 1971, Sleek submitted
an environmental checklist to the Department of Natural Resources, which
provided that Sleek would plant trees to enhance vegetation on the property
and would install dry wells to mitigate storm water impacts. Utilizing
Logging, Sleek clear-cut and graded her property in 1994; however, she
took no action to revegetate the land or to reduce the flow of surface water
over the sites. Sleek also never installed the required dry wells. The
following year, the natural sink area in the Currenses' property flooded
causing eleven trees to fall, and the Currenses removed an additional
twenty trees in order to ensure the safety of their home.
The common enemy doctrine governed the issues on appeal, because it
had directed the law of surface water in Washington since 1896. In its
strictest form, the common enemy doctrine allowed landowners to dispose
of unwanted surface water in any way they see fit, without liability for

